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Abstract
In this paper we propose methods to compute the Deegan-Packel, the Public
Good, and the Shift power indices by generating functions for the particular
case of weighted voting games. Furthermore, we dene a new power index
which combines the ideas of the Shift and the Deegan-Packel power indices and
also propose a method to compute it with generating functions. We conclude
by some comments about the complexity to compute these power indices.
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1. Introduction
Generating functions are used in several operational research problems to
construct counting algorithms [13, 38, 30]. The exibility of the generating
functions allows the development of nite algorithms for problems related to
inclusion and exclusion questions as, e.g., optimal allocation [27, 24], discrete
optimization [40, 11, 36], production control [18], weighted voting systems [28,
26, 22, 23, 25] or computation of power indices for weighted majority games [8,
1].
The classical power indices suggested in order to assess the a priori distribu-
tion of power in a simple game include the Shapley-Shubik [34, 33], the Banzhaf
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[6], the Johnston [19], the Deegan-Packel [12], and the Public Good [15] power
indices. This is not a comprehensive list and other power indices could be listed;
we just mention here one more power index, the Shift power index introduced
in Alonso-Meijide and Freixas [4], since we will deal with a slight variation of it
(the Shift Deegan-Packel power index) in this paper.
One of the main diculties with these indices is that computation generally
requires the sum of a very large number of terms. Owen in [31] introduces the
multilinear extension of an n-person game as a help in computing the power
indices of large games, and gives a generalization of the Shapley-Shubik power
index. Owen in [32] also shows that the Banzhaf power index can be obtained
by dierentiating the multilinear extension of a game. Later, Alonso-Meijide
et al. [3] presents again the multilinear extension to compute the Johnston, the
Deegan-Packel and the Public Good power indices.
A dierent useful procedure to compute power indices is provided by the
generating functions techniques. The main objective of this paper is to analyze
whether some modication of the generating function techniques might be used
to calculate the Deegan-Packel, the Public Good, and the Shift power indices for
weighted voting games. These three indices are dened on the basis of either
minimal winning coalitions (in the case of the Deegan-Packel and the Public
Good indices) or shift-minimal winning coalitions (in the case of the Shift power
index) [4]. Specially in games with a large number of players, it is not known a
priori which coalitions are minimal winning or shift-minimal winning.
The advantage of the procedures presented here is that once the correspond-
ing generating function has been dened, we provide an algorithm to easily
compute these indices. Although some techniques on generating functions have
been applied to computing (the Shapley-Shubik, the Banzhaf-Coleman and the
Owen) power indices [1, 21, 7], now we complete such analysis and provide new
methods, based again on generating functions, to compute the Deegan-Packel,
the Public Good, and the Shift power indices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to reviewing the main
power indices and to introducing a new power index. In Section 3, we recall
generating functions and present new methods based on them to compute the
Public Good, the Deegan-Packel, the Shift and the Shift Deegan-Packel power
indices by means of generating functions. In section 4 we provide the required
complexity for our methods. Conclusion and future research end the paper in
Section 5.
2. Preliminaries: Simple games and power indices
A simple game consists of a nite set of players N and a set of winning
coalitions, W, which is a collection of subsets of N with the following three
properties: ; =2 W; N 2 W; and monotonicity : If S 2 W and S  T , then
T 2 W.
Thus, either the family of winning coalitions W or the subfamily of minimal
winning coalitions Wm = fS 2 W : T  S ) T =2 Wg with the inclusion
determines the game.
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For the interested reader, there are some applications and specic studies
about simple games in [20, 17, 39, 35].
The class of weighted voting games is probably the most important subfamily
of simple games since many real-world examples are of this type. Generating
functions apply precisely to the class of weighted voting games and therefore
constitute a meaningful tool to compute power indices for these games. As far
as we know this technique has only been applied for the Banzhaf (and Coleman),
the Shapley-Shubik and the Owen power indices [1, 21, 7]. The main goal of the
paper is to provide a systematic symbolic approach to compute four alternative
signicant power indices. Our power indices will be dened from weighted voting
games. (N;W) is called a weighted voting game if there exist natural integers
w1; : : : ; wn such that every coalition S veries S 2 W if and only if the sum of
the wi's, i 2 S, is at least equal to some preset quota q, i.e.,
P
i2S
wi  q.
The number wi is interpreted as the number of votes that player i owns,
and q is the least total number of votes necessary to pass a decision. Such
representation for (N;W) is indicated by [q;w1; w2; : : : ; wn], where it is assumed
that w1  w2      wn, and w(S) stands for
P
i2S wi. Note that for n  4
there are simple games which are not weighted, but every simple game can be
written as an intersection of weighted voting games.
Loosely speaking, a power index is a function g which assigns to a simple
game (N;W) a vector g(N;W) 2 Rn where each component gi(N;W) is a
measure for the ith player in the simple game (N;W) according to g. As N
does not change in the rest of the paper, we will write g(W) instead of g(N;W)
hereafter. Table 1 shows known denitions of power indices (see e.g. [14] for
a comprehensive treatment on power indices) that will be considered in this
work. In this table we use a known notation: Given a simple game (N;W), we
dene a swing for player i by a coalition S  N n fig such that S 62 W but
S [ fig 2 W, and we denote i(W) the number of swings for player i 2 N . We
also dene s = jSj and Ci = fS  N n fig : S 62 W ^ S [ fig 2 Wg so that
i(W) = jCij. Let Wmi = fS 2 Wm : i 2 Sg; and let ci(W) = jWmi j. To dene
the Shift power index [4], it is necessary to introduce the desirability relation
dened in [16].
Let (N;W) be a simple game, i and j be two players. Players i and j are
said to be equally desirable, denoted by i  j, if for any coalition S 2 N nfi; jg,
then S [ fig 2 W , S [ fjg 2 W. Let (N;W) be a simple game, i and j be
two voters, then player i is said to be (strictly) more desirable than j, denoted
by i  j, if the following two conditions are fullled:
1. 8S 2 N n fi; jg, then S [ fjg 2 W ) S [ fig 2 W:
2. 9T 2 N n fi; jg such that T [ fig 2 W and T [ fjg =2 W.
Let again (N;W) be a simple game, i and j be two voters, then player i is
said to be at least as desirable as j (as a coalitional partner), denoted by i % j,
if i  j or i  j. The % relation is known as the desirability relation.
Now, we go in deep into the notion of shift minimal winning coalitions. See
[35] for references and history on the mathematical use of the shift ordering.
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Power Index Definition References
Banzhaf relative i (W) = i(W)nP
j=1
j(W)
[6]
Shapley-Shubik 'i (W) =
P
S2Ci
s! (n s 1)!
n! [34]
Deegan-Packel i (W) = 1jWmj
P
S2Wmi
1
s [12]
Public Good hi(W) = ci(W)nP
j=1
cj(W)
[15]
Shift fi(W) = si(W)nP
j=1
sj(W)
[4]
Table 1: Some known power indices.
Let (N;W) be a simple game and % be its desirability relation. A coalition
S 2 Wm is shift minimal if for every i 2 S and j =2 S such that i  j it holds
(S n fig) [ fjg =2 W. From now on, the set of shift minimal winning coalitions
will be denoted by Ws, i.e.,
Ws = fS 2 Wm : 8(i 2 S ^ j 62 S : i  j) ) (S n fig) [ fjg 62 W)g :
Moreover, we denote si(W) = jWsi j, where Wsi = fS 2 Ws : i 2 Sg.
Finally, we introduce another power index which combines the ideas of the
Shift and the Deegan-Packel indices, as far as we know this is a new power
index. Let (N;W) be a simple game, the Shift Deegan-Packel index for each
player i 2 N is the real number:
i (W) = 1jWsj
X
S2Wsi
1
s
so that
nX
i=1
i (W) = 1:
It assumes that:
1. Only shift minimal winning coalitions will emerge victorious,
2. Each shift minimal winning coalition has an equal probability of forming,
and
3. Players in a shift minimal winning coalition divide the \spoils" equally.
The Shift-Deegan Packel index is an intermediate solution between the Deegan-
Packel index and the Shift power index. In its denition, only shift minimal
winning coalitions appear, but the matter may be approached dierently than
the Shift index, because the size of the coalitions is taken into account. The
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involved coalitions in the computation of the Shift Deegan-Packel index and the
Shift index are the same, and the number of these involved coalitions is inferior
to that of Deegan-Packel and Public Good indices.
3. Generating functions to compute the Deegan-Packel, Public Good,
Shift and Shift Deegan-Packel power indices
In general, the computation of the previous indices needs a great number of
operations. Generating functions [13, 38, 30] give us a useful method to count
the number of elements c (r) of a nite set, where these elements have a cong-
uration that depends on a characteristic r: An application of these functions in
the eld of simple games allows to recover the number of possible coalitions of a
given kind from the set of its coecients, while the voting power of the coalition
can easily be read looking at its set of exponents. Brams and Auso [9] provide
an example of a generating function for the classical power indices.
The generating function of the sequence of numbers [a0; a1; a2; : : :] is the
formal series F (t) =
P
i0 ait
i, and can be nite or innite. The variable t
serves to identify ai as the coecient of t
i in F (t):
Example 1. Consider the series
nY
r=1
(1 + xrt) =
nX
r=0
art
r;
where a0 = 1 and for r > 0; ar is given by
ar =
X
1i1<i2<:::<irn
xi1xi2 : : : xir :
The coecients ar are symmetric functions on the variables x1; x2; : : : ; xn: The
number of terms of the coecient ar coincides with the number of combinations
of r elements of a nite set formed by n elements. If all the values xr are 1 it
holds that
(1 + t)
n
=
nX
r=0

n
r

tr;
because, in this case the coecients ar are the number of combinations of r
elements of a nite set formed by n elements. Then, the function F (t) =
(1 + t)
n
is the generating function of the numbers ar =
 
n
r

: r = 0; 1; : : : ; n
	
:
That is, the binomial coecients
 
n
r

can be obtained by means of the function
(1 + t)
n
because they coincide with the coecients of the formal series.
Next, we will use generating functions of several variables, for example
F (x; y; z) =
X
k0
X
j0
X
l0
akjl x
kyjzl;
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where akjl are real numbers depending on k; j and l.
Cantor [10] (and Lucas [29]) used this method to compute the Shapley-
Shubik index and Brams and Auso [9] used the same method to compute
the Banzhaf index. In [21, 7] generating functions are used to compute power
indices in games with restricted situations and in games with multiple majority.
Alonso-Meijide and Bowles [2] used the same method to compute power indices
in games endowed with a coalition structure and presented an application to the
International Monetary Fund. Alonso-Meijide et al. [1] also used the generating
functions to compute power indices in multiple majority games with a coalition
structure and also presented an application to the European Union. In all
these papers, the power indices are either the Banzhaf or the Shapley-Shubik
ones (or modications of them). To our knowledge, the method of generating
functions is only used to compute indices based on the number of swings. In
this paper, we present a result that allows the computation, with generating
functions, of indices not based on the number of swings but based on minimal
(or shift-minimal) winning coalitions.
3.1. Deegan-Packel and Public Good power indices
In this section we provide a method to compute Deegan-Packel and Public
Good power indices by means of the generating function in a weighted voting
game. As far as we know this is a new procedure.
To compute the Deegan-Packel index in a weighted voting game, rst, we will
employ a polynomial that has as many addends as coalitions can be formed, i.e.,
2n coalitions. Among them, we will retain the addends that correspond to the
winning coalitions, and, nally, among them, we will only keep the monomials
that correspond to minimal winning coalitions. To obtain this polynomial, we
need to employ n + 2 variables; one for each player, another to indicate the
number of players in each coalition and, nally, a variable that indicates the
weight of the coalition.
Let (N;W) be a simple game, and let mik (W) be the number of minimal
winning coalitions with cardinality k which the player i belongs to. Then the
Deegan-Packel index for player i 2 N can be expressed as (see previous denition
in Table 1):
i (W) = 1jWmj
X
S2Wmi
1
s
=
1
jWmj
nX
k=1
mik (W)
k
:
Now, given a weighted voting game (N;W) with representation [q; w1; w2; :::; wn],
we establish three steps to compute mik (W). In the rst step, we consider the
generating function given by
S (x; z1; z2; : : : zn; t) :=
nY
k=1
(1 + xwk zk t) :
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The corresponding coecient ci1;:::;ikk;j of S (x; z1; z2; : : : zn; t),
S (x; z1; z2; : : : zn; t) =
X
k;j1
ci1;:::;ikk;j x
j tk zi1 : : : zik ;
is the number of coalitions with players i1; : : : ; ik (coalition with cardinality k)
whose weights add j (i.e., wi1 + : : :+ wik = j).
In the second step, we remove those monomials in which the power of x is
less than q, that is, we only keep winning coalitions. In the last third step,
we remove those monomials which are divisible by another monomial of the
function, that is, we only keep minimal winning coalitions. The total number of
terms of this function coincides with the number of minimal winning coalitions
of the game, jWmj.
Finally, to obtain the number mik(W), we only need to select those terms
of the previous function in which the variable zi appears. The power of the
variable t indicates the number of players of this minimal winning coalition.
Below we present an example to compute the Deegan-Packel index.
Example 2. Consider the weighted voting game (N;W) with representation
[30; 28; 16; 5; 4; 3; 3] :
In a rst step, we compute the function S (x; z1; z2; : : : ; z6; t)
S (x; z1; z2; : : : ; z6; t) =
nY
k=1
(1 + xwkzkt) =
 
1 + x28z1t
  
1 + x16z2t
  
1 + x5z3t
  
1 + x4z4t
  
1 + x3z5t
  
1 + x3z6t

=
x59z1z2z3z4z5z6t
6 + x31z2z3z4z5z6t
5 + x43z1z3z4z5z6t
5 + x54z1z2z4z5z6t
5+
x55z1z2z3z5z6t
5 + x56z1z2z3z4z6t
5 + x56z1z2z3z4z5t
5 + x15z3z4z5z6t
4+
x26z2z4z5z6t
4+x27z2z3z5z6t
4+x28z2z3z4z6t
4+x28z2z3z4z5t
4+x38z1z4z5z6t
4+
x39z1z3z5z6t
4+x40z1z3z4z6t
4+x40z1z3z4z5t
4+x50z1z2z5z6t
4+x51z1z2z4z6t
4+
x51z1z2z4z5t
4 + x52z1z2z3z6t
4 + x52z1z2z3z5t
4 + x53z1z2z3z4t
4 + x10z4z5z6t
3+
x11z3z5z6t
3 + x11z3z4z6t
3 + x12z3z4z5t
3 + x22z2z5z6t
3 + x23z2z4z6t
3+
x23z2z4z5t
3 + x24z2z3z6t
3 + x24z2z3z5t
3 + x25z2z3z4t
3 + x34z1z5z6t
3+
x35z1z4z6t
3 + x35z1z4z5t
3 + x36z1z3z6t
3 + x36z1z3z5t
3 + x37z1z3z4t
3+
x47z1z2z6t
3 + x47z1z2z5t
3 + x48z1z2z4t
3 + x49z1z2z3t
3+
x44z1z2t
2 + x33z1z3t
2 + x32z1z4t
2 + x31z1z5t
2 + x31z1z6t
2+
x21z2z3t
2 + x20z2z4t
2 + x19z2z5t
2 + x19z2z6t
2 + x9z3z4t
2+
x8z3z5t
2 + x8z3z6t
2 + x7z4z5t
2 + x7z4z6t
2 + x6z5z6t
2+
7
x28z1t+ x
16z2t+ x
5z3t+ x
4z4t+ x
3z5t+ x
3z6t+ 1:
In a second step, we choose those terms in which the power of x is greater than
or equal to 30, that is,
x59z1z2z3z4z5z6t
6 + x31z2z3z4z5z6t
5 + x43z1z3z4z5z6t
5+
x54z1z2z4z5z6t
5 + x55z1z2z3z5z6t
5 + x56z1z2z3z4z6t
5 + x56z1z2z3z4z5t
5+
x38z1z4z5z6t
4 + x39z1z3z5z6t
4 + x40z1z3z4z6t
4 + x40z1z3z4z5t
4+
x50z1z2z5z6t
4 + x51z1z2z4z6t
4 + x51z1z2z4z5t
4 + x52z1z2z3z6t
4+
x52z1z2z3z5t
4 + x53z1z2z3z4t
4 + x34z1z5z6t
3 + x35z1z4z6t
3+
+x35z1z4z5t
3 + x36z1z3z6t
3 + x36z1z3z5t
3 + x37z1z3z4t
3
+x47z1z2z6t
3 + x47z1z2z5t
3 + x48z1z2z4t
3 + x49z1z2z3t
3
+x44z1z2t
2 + x33z1z3t
2 + x32z1z4t
2 + x31z1z5t
2 + x31z1z6t
2:
In a third step, we choose those terms that can not be divided by dierent ones,
that is, we have the sum of the prime terms:
x31z2z3z4z5z6t
5 + x44z1z2t
2 + x33z1z3t
2 + x32z1z4t
2 + x31z1z5t
2 + x31z1z6t
2:
As the number of monomials in the later polynomial is 6; it follows that, jWmj =
6. To compute the Deegan-Packel index of a player i 2 N we should add those
terms in which the variable zi is present, divided by the corresponding power
of the variable t; and, nally, we should divide the obtained result by jWmj :
For instance, to compute the Deegan-Packel index of player 4 we have that z4
appears in two terms, and dividing by the corresponding power of variable t; we
obtain 1=5 + 1=2 = 7=10; and dividing again by jWmj we get its Deegan-Packel
index 7=60.
We follow the same steps to compute the Deegan-Packel index for the other
players:
 (W) =

5
12
;
7
60
;
7
60
;
7
60
;
7
60
;
7
60

:
In a similar way, we can compute the Public Good index from the last prime
terms taking into account the denition
hi(W) = ci(W)nP
j=1
cj(W)
so that
nX
i=1
hi(W) = 1;
where ci(W) = jWsi j = jfS 2 Wsi ^ i 2 Sgj. In the case of Example 2 the last
prime terms are
x31z2z3z4z5z6t
5 + x44z1z2t
2 + x33z1z3t
2 + x32z1z4t
2 + x31z1z5t
2 + x31z1z6t
2
and then we have
h(W) = 1
15
(5; 2; 2; 2; 2; 2) =

5
15
;
2
15
;
2
15
;
2
15
;
2
15
;
2
15

:
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3.2. Shift power index and Shift Deegan-Packel power index
Now we present a method to compute Shift and Shift Deegan-Packel power
indices by means of the generating function in a weighted voting game.
As it happens with the Deegan-Packel index, we need to employ n+2 variables;
one for each player, another to indicate the number of players in each coalition
and, nally, a variable that indicates the weight of the coalition.
Let (N;W) be a simple game, and let smik (W) be the number of shift
minimal winning coalitions of cardinality k which the player i belongs to. The
shift power index of i in that game is equal to
fi(W) =
nP
k=1
smik(W)
nP
j=1
nP
k=1
smjk(W)
:
Now, the rst step consists of computing the function S (x; z1; z2; : : : ; zn; t) de-
scribed above. In the second step, we must remove such terms where the power
of x is less than q, that is, we choose only winning coalitions. We obtain a new
function S0 (x; z1; z2; : : : ; zn; t).
After this second step, we dene a partition P = fP1; P2; : : : ; Pmg of the set
of players N in such a way that two players i; j 2 Pr if they belong to the same
number of winning coalitions, that is, the number of terms of the function S0
that contains to zi coincides with the number of terms of the function S
0 that
contains to zj . If r < r
0; and i 2 Pr and j 2 Pr0 the number of terms of S0
that contains to zi is greater than the number of terms that contain to zj . It is
clear then, that 1 2 P1 and n 2 Pm: In this third step, we remove from S0 such
terms that can be divided among a dierent term of the function. We obtain a
new function S00: The total number of terms of this function coincides with the
number of minimal winning coalitions of the game, jWmj : This function S00 can
be written as:
S00 = S00(1) + S00(2) + S00(3) + : : :+ S00(n)
where a term of S00 belongs to S00(k) if the power of t is equal to k, i.e., if the
number of players involved in that term is k.
From S00 we remove the terms
xa  zi1  zi2  : : :  zij 1  zij  zij+1  : : :  zik 1  zik  tk 2 S00(k)
with ij 2 Pr, if there exists a term
xa  zi1  zi2  : : :  zij 1  zip  zij+1  : : :  zik 1  zik  tk 2 S00(k)
with ip 2 Pr0 and r < r0. After these deletions, we obtain a function S000. The
total number of terms of this new function S000 coincides with the number of
shift minimal winning coalitions of the game.
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Finally, on the one hand, to obtain the Shift power index of player i 2 N we
only need to select those terms of the previous function S000 in which the variable
zi appears.
Example 3. Consider the weighted voting game with representation
[5; 4; 3; 1; 1; 1] :
In a rst step, we compute the function S (x; z1; z2; : : : ; z5; t)
S (x; z1; z2; : : : ; z5; t) =
nY
j=1
(1 + xwjzjt) =
 
1 + x4z1t
  
1 + x3z2t

(1 + xz3t) (1 + xz4t) (1 + xz5t) =
x10z1z2z3z4z5t
5 + x6z2z3z4z5t
4 + x7z1z3z4z5t
4 + x9z1z2z4z5t
4+
x9z1z2z3z5t
4 + x9z1z2z3z4t
4 + x3z3z4z5t
3 + x5z2z4z5t
3+
x5z2z3z5t
3 + x5z2z3z4t
3 + x6z1z4z5t
3 + x6z1z3z5t
3 + x6z1z3z4t
3+
+x8z1z2z5t
3 + x8z1z2z4t
3 + x8z1z2z3t
3+
x7z1z2t
2 + x5z1z3t
2 + x5z1z4t
2 + x5z1z5t
2+
x4z2z3t
2 + x4z2z4t
2 + x4z2z5t
2 + x2z3z4t
2+
x2z3z5t
2 + x2z4z5t
2+
x4z1t+ x
3z2t+ xz3t+ xz4t+ xz5t+ 1:
In a second step, we choose those terms in which the power of x is greater than
or equal to 5, that is,
S0 (x; z1; z2; : : : ; z5; t) =
x10z1z2z3z4z5t
5 + x6z2z3z4z5t
4 + x7z1z3z4z5t
4 + x9z1z2z4z5t
4+
x9z1z2z3z5t
4 + x9z1z2z3z4t
4 + x5z2z4z5t
3+
x5z2z3z5t
3 + x5z2z3z4t
3 + x6z1z4z5t
3 + x6z1z3z5t
3 + x6z1z3z4t
3+
+x8z1z2z5t
3 + x8z1z2z4t
3 + x8z1z2z3t
3+
x7z1z2t
2 + x5z1z3t
2 + x5z1z4t
2 + x5z1z5t
2:
The partition dened by the previous function is P = ff1g ; f2g ; f3; 4; 5gg be-
cause the respective number of monomials containing i for i = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 is
15; 12; 11; 11; 11:
In a third step, we choose those terms that can not be divided by dierent ones,
that is, we have the function:
S00 (x; z1; z2; : : : ; z5; t) = x5z2z4z5t3 + x5z2z3z5t3 + x5z2z3z4t3+
x7z1z2t
2 + x5z1z3t
2 + x5z1z4t
2 + x5z1z5t
2:
As the terms x7z1z2t
2; x5z1z3t
2 2 S00(2) and 2 2 P2 and 3 2 P3; we remove the
term x7z1z2t
2 in S00 to get S000: To compute the shift power index of a player
i 2 N we add those terms in S000 in which the variable zi is present, that is:
si (W) = 3 for all i 2 N; and therefore fi (W) = 1=5 for all i 2 N:
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Analogously, for the Shift Deegan-Packel index we use S000 and for each
player i 2 N we add the converses of the power of t for each monomial where i
is presented.
With this procedure, for Example 3 we obtain:
i (W) =
8><>:
1
4 if i = 1
1
6 if i = 2
7
36 otherwise
4. Some comments on complexity
The computation of Deegan-Packel, Public Good, Shift and Shift Deegan-
Packel power indices are based on function
S (x; z1; z2; : : : zn; t) =
nY
k=1
(1 + xwk zk t) :
The number of products to compute S(x; z1; z2; : : : ; zn; t) is O(2n). Thus,
Deegan-Packel and Public Good power indices can be computed in O(2n),
whereas Shift and Shift Deegan-Packel power indices require O(2n n) because it
also needs to compute S00.
However, when computing S(x; z1; z2; : : : ; zn; t) we could stop the products
among monomials when the power  of x veries that   q. That is, we
could directly compute only the sum of the weights of the players that belong
to S 2 (L [Wm). Thus, the complexity to compute Deegan-Packel and Public
Good power indices is
O
0@ X
S2(L[Wm)
s
1A ;
whereas the complexity to compute Shift and Shift Deegan-Packel power indices
is
O
0@n X
S2(L[Wm)
s
1A :
Note that, although the time complexity is high (not polinomial, in general)
as in other methods, here we have an advantage with the space complexity re-
quired because generating funtions need a minimum space to do sums and prod-
ucts. Moreover, it is easier to compute power indices with generating functions
than using other methods from the denition; see [37] to know other methods
to compute power indices.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
We present some known indices for simple games and some methods to
compute them. As far as we know, we dene a new power index, the Shift
11
Deegan-Packel power index, which combines the ideas of the Shift power index
and the Deegan-Packel power index. We describe a new method to compute four
power indices (Deegan-Packel, Public Good, Shift and Shift Deegan-Packel) by
means of generating functions. The corresponding (exponential) complexity
depends on losing coalitions plus minimal winning coalitions.
For future work, it would be interesting to reduce the complexity with similar
techniques by means of generating functions, and to compare our techniques
with others like (Quasi-reduced and Ordered) Binary Decision Diagrams [8] or
polinomial algorithms [5].
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